Demo data. Example Corp is fictitious, and nothing you do here is saved.
Tool refund_angry_customer
A tool AI agents call, on the MCP server Example Corp assistant.
No approved baseline: nobody approved this tool's scopes.
- Says about itself
- readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: false, openWorldHint: false
- Calls
- None
- Scopes it holds
- user:read, crm:write, refund:under_500, payments:transfer, billing:invoices:read
Warning Too many scopes for one tool
This tool needs more than four scopes. Asked all at once, they make a consent screen people approve without reading, or refuse. It is often a task tool built on top of several APIs.
Scopes concerned: user:read, crm:write, refund:under_500, payments:transfer, billing:invoices:read
ScopeNeat recommendation: Ask first for the read scopes, and the others only when the tool attempts the action that needs them (step-up). Check whether some scopes are near-duplicates.
Next step: The MCP server owner decides which scopes are asked first and which only at step-up, and the developer changes the mapping.
Accountable MCP server owner
Sources: Published security guidance
Consent abandonment: users decline dialogs listing excessive scopes
MCP Security Best Practices Scope Minimization Incremental elevation via targeted WWW-Authenticate scope="..." challenges when privileged operations are first attempted
MCP Security Best Practices Scope Minimization References (1)
A finding supports evidence for these requirements. On its own it does not make an organization compliant.
RTS 2024/1774 Art. 21(a) Related
the assignment of access rights to ICT assets based on need-to-know, need-to-use and least privilege principles, including for remote and emergency access
Applies as: legal requirement. Binds the EU financial entities under DORA. Entities under the simplified framework follow Article 33 instead of Article 21.
Warning High-impact tool, plan a human approval
This tool can delete, pay, execute or administer, from its annotations or its scopes. A consent given once at sign-in does not cover each of these actions.
ScopeNeat recommendation: Ask a human to approve each call, with the details of the action, before it runs.
Next step: The resource owner approves the tool and its human approval mode, with security consulted because the tool changes state.
Accountable Resource owner
Sources: Published security guidance
Use human-in-the-loop control to require a human to approve high-impact actions before they are taken.
OWASP Top 10 for LLM 2026 LLM03:2026, mitigation 6 Prompt for user confirmation on sensitive operations
MCP Tools Security Considerations